Background
From exploring the most trader-friendly order setup to achieve low latency for price feeds, the progression of decentralized perpetual trading was nonstop. Although an increasing number of traders onboard perpetual DEXes for self-custody, the daily active organic users of all perp DEXes combined are still below 5,000; meanwhile, millions of users trade on CEXes daily, and perpetual DEXes still have enormous growth potential.
One key factor that constraints trader acquisition for perpetual DEXes is the trading cost. The typical fee rate range on CEXes is 0.02% - 0.05%, and we are witnessing leading perpetual DEXes adapt to more competitive fee structures. For example, Kwenta offers a fee rates range of 0.04% - 0.15% for crypto markets, and GMX’s to-be-released V2 also announced a fee rate range of 0% - 0.1%, with an initial rate of 0.05%
References:
- Kwenta Fee Rates: Kwenta
- GMX V2 Fee Setting Proposal: # GMX V2: (i) UPDATING THE GMX-INTERFACE CODEBASE AND (ii) GMX V2 FEE SETTINGS - #2 by coinflipcanda - Proposals - GMX
As the first widely-adopted perpetual trading aggregator, MUX always wishes to innovate and push the boundary of this space along with other trading protocols. Aiming to be the one-stop access for on-chain trading, MUX will continue advancing the native setup and integrations to offer the best possible trading experiences and the most competitive trading cost, even with CEX standards.
Proposal
In preparation for the next chapter of decentralized perpetual trading with a potential user number surge, MUX native pool needs to stay competitive in terms of trading cost, and MUX contributors would like to propose the following:
Change the MUXLP pool’s fixed 0.08% trading fee rate to a fee rate range of 0.05 - 0.08%, with an initial rate of 0.08%.
This change will allow dynamic fee rate adjustments under the MUX native pool and prevent volume defection caused by trading cost changes in the market. The new dynamic fee range can lead to a potential short-term protocol income decrease; MUXLP stakers, veMUX holders, and POL might earn less ETH. However, as the user base of decentralized perpetual trading protocols continues to expand, MUX can potentially attract more trading volume to stay competitive in the market, then the income can continue to grow.
Next Steps
- Community discussion surrounding this proposal
- Community members vote to approve/disapprove this proposal